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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 76 
Accident time: 15:15 Accident Date: 08/08/1997 




Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 18/08/1997 
ID original source: DM Name of source: MAG 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Mortar Ground condition: demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude: __° __' __" 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: Long: 106.19' 12.7"E Map north: Lat: 15.42' 05.4" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
An internal accident report was written for the demining group by a "Senior Ordinance 
Specialist" and dated 18th August 1997. The following summarises its content.  
1 
The team were to destroy pre-positioned munitions at a demolition site where the ground was 
waterlogged clay soil. There were two pits on the site, each containing three 4.2 inch HE 
mortars. The pits had independent firing cables to a point 330m to the East. The demolition 
took place at 14:20.  
After a few minutes the victim and his interpreter left the firing point to watch a large column of 
smoke, indicating that some of the mortars had not been HE but had contained white 
phosphorus. At about 14:50 they, and three technicians approached the pits and saw lumps 
of white phosphorus scattered around. At 15:10 the victim went to the pit alone to see if it was 
safe to leave it. At that time it was past working hours on a Friday and no more demolitions 
were planned until the following Monday. 
Using a spade he moved some white phosphorus that he thought was posing a hazard to 
undergrowth six metres from the pit. While he was doing this there was an explosion in the pit 
and phosphorus was thrown onto his hands and clothing. [This occurred at about 15:15.] The 
victim immediately removed his clothing. The senior Lao ordnance specialist present stated 
that the victim stripped to his underpants and mud was put on his hand, thigh and back. When 
the victim arrived at the Provincial Hospital (said to be "no time") no-one knew how to treat 
phosphorus burns, so the victim had to instruct the medical staff. The victim's own statement 
included a detailed description of his wounds and stated that the time for hospitalisation was 
40 minutes.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that "the explosion was caused by an HE burster and/or fuse 
"cooking off". This also resulted in another mortar being ejected from the pit". The victim did 
not handle all the mortars prior to demolition and there was a small possibility that had he 
done so he would have noticed the difference in weight between HE and White Phosphorus 
mortars (about 1 pound or 0.45Kg). 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that larger demolition charges be used if it is suspected that 
ordnance contains White Phosphorus, that they allow a minimum soak time of four hours 
before returning to a pit and if possible do not return until the next day. They added that 
personnel should wear protective clothing when inspecting a pit and that training should be 
given to medics and trainees at the UXO Lao school about White Phosphorus burns. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 106 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available 
(insured) 
Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: none 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available: see Accident report. 
The victim described his injuries as  "Minor burns to back and arms. Shallow burn right thigh 
2.5cm x 1cn. shallow burn left thigh 4cm x 2cm Shallow burn back of left hand 1.5cm x 1cm."  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the victim was a senior Technical Advisor and so a part of the demining group's management 
team. He either breached SOPs, or the management had failed to devise appropriate SOPs 
in the first place.  
The premature approach to the pit and the failure to wear protective clothing were significant 
failings of procedure that were (apparently) recognised by the victim. 
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